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For decades, most industrialised countries have implemented some forms of fiscal and 
financial incentives to stimulate fixed capital formation. Tax cuts and capital grants are 
of great use in regional policy. Since these instruments mobilise huge amounts of public 
resources the issue of their efficiency is of particular interest for policymakers. 
 
The impact of taxation on investment income was traditionally apprehended through 
models measuring the effective tax rate on marginal investments. However recent 
literature, especially Devereux and Griffith (2002), showed the interest of resorting to 
an alternative tax measure – the effective average tax rate (EATR) - when firms face 
discrete investment choices that are expected to generate positive economic rent before 
tax. This effective average tax rate is defined by the difference between the net present 
value of the rent of the investment before and after taxes scaled by the net present value 
of the pre-tax income stream. In this sense, the effective average tax rate developed by 
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Devereux and Griffith (2002) seems to be particularly relevant to shed a new light on 
the relative effectiveness of tax cuts and capital subsidy grants. 
 
In this paper we intend to compare the costs for public authorities to lower the corporate 
tax rate or to grant a capital subsidy. These public costs are directly affected by the 
variation of the after-tax revenue earned by the shareholder. The extent to which each 
policy must be implemented depends on the channel chosen by the government to 
stimulate investment. We pay attention to two of these channels: a reduction of the 
capital cost and a lowering of the EATR. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of 
our approach, we developed a numerical example for the Belgian case. 
 
JEL Classification: H25, H32 and R58  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Economic development is uneven over space. Regions are characterised by 
performance disparities in factor productivity: some regions are ahead, whereas others 
lag behind. This discrepancy gives rise to unbalanced patterns of economic growth, with 
firms deserting underproductive areas to locate in more productive regions. This 
grounds a regional policy aimed at achieving a better geographical distribution of 
economic activities. Indeed, as Thisse (2000) points out, most regional policy debates in 
industrialised countries implicitly assume that there is too much spatial concentration in 
economic activity. Moreover the cumulative nature of agglomeration economies still 
reinforces the need for some public intervention. Conversely, the efficiency of regional 
policy remains a much debated issue.   
 
By and large, the government will seek to promote investments in lagging regions by 
decreasing the costs of production factor. Such a policy is expected to affect regional 
economies in a double way: on the one hand, public intervention might strengthen 
indigenous growth by expanding local firms’ investment demand. On the other hand, it 
might improve the attractiveness of lagging regions so to induce non-regional firms to 
relocate their activities there. The former case refers to the so-called investment creation 
effect, whereas the second is related to the investment diversion argument. The 
government may be sensitive to one or the other argument when it formulates its   
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regional policy mix so that the effectiveness of public aid will accordingly vary. In this 
paper, we intend to assess the regional policy efficiency first when the government aims 
at expanding local firms’ investment demand and then when it seeks to act on firms’ 
location decisions. In this preliminary version, we only consider a domestic framework, 
leaving aside international analysis for a latter stage. 
 
To achieve their objectives, regional policymakers have numerous instruments at their 
disposal. We have chosen to restrict the analyse to the direct fiscal and financial 
investment incentives, so neglecting public expenditures in infrastructure. More 
precisely, we will concentrate on two broad categories of aid: a corporate tax cut and 
the granting of a capital subsidy. 
 
Models of effective taxation have proved to be an appropriate framework to assess the 
impact of fiscal and financial incentives on firm’s investment decisions. Traditionally, 
these models evaluate the effect of public policy on the cost of capital and the marginal 
investment. Grounded on the seminal work of King and Fullerton (1984), this approach 
provides an indicator – the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) – of the distortion of tax 
system on the marginal investment decisions of the firm. However recent literature, 
especially Devereux and Griffith (2003), showed the interest of resorting to an 
alternative tax measure – the effective average tax rate (EATR) – when firms face 
discrete investment choices that are expected to generate a positive economic rent 
before tax. In this respect, as regional markets are by nature imperfectly competitive, 
the EATR model provides certainly a valuable tool for spatial economics analysis. In 
addition, as emphasized by Giannini and Maggiulli (2002), it has the advantage of 
allowing the computation of both effective marginal and average tax rates within a 
single framework. 
 
Nevertheless, the average approach does not make the marginal analysis obsolete. Both 
approaches are complementary. Indeed as explained by Devereux and Griffith (2003), 
conditional on the choice of location, the size of the investment depends on the EMTR, 
but the choice of location depends on the level of the EATR. In this respect, the 
government willing to promote regional endogenous economic development will assess 
regional policy according to its impact on the EMTR. If the authorities are more 
sensitive to the investment diversion risk, they will rather seek to lower the EATR. The   
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extent and consequently the efficacy of public incentives therefore depend upon the 
policymakers’ objectives.  
 
However in order to compare policies whose effects are rather different in kind and are 
costly in various ways, the efficacy of public incentives alone does not constitute an 
appropriate indicator for policy makers. Public authorities would instead consider the 
efficiency of their intervention, that is, for a given level of efficacy, the extent of public 
expenses associated with the granting of fiscal and financial incentives. Intuitively, the 
cost for the public sector corresponds to the fiscal revenue forgone due to policy-
induced reduction of the effective tax rate. Using Devereux and Griffith (2003)’s 
framework, we derive the public cost expressions by measuring the sensitivity of the 
post-tax economic rent to the variation of the public aid.  
 
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 displays Devereux and Griffith (2003)’s 
theoretical framework. The effective average tax rate is defined by the difference 
between the net present value of the rent of the investment before and after tax scaled 
by the net present value of the pre-tax income stream. The post-tax economic rent is the 
key parameter in Devereux and Griffith (2003)’s model. By calculating the sensitivity 
of this parameter to the policy instruments, Section 3 derives the public cost associated 
with the granting of a tax cut and a capital subsidy. Section 3 also investigates how to 
determine the extent of both incentives first when the government is willing to 
encourage investment from indigenous regional entrepreneurs and on the other hand 
when it seeks to attract non-regional firms’ activities. Accordingly, the extent of the tax 
rate and capital grant changes are calculated so that each instrument lowers by the same 
percentage the EMTR and the EATR, respectively. In Section 4, a numerical example is 
developed in order to illustrate our approach and its relevance. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2.  The model of Devereux and Griffith (1999 and 2003) 
 
The extent to which a tax on income from capital affects the firms’ behaviour has 
been traditionally analysed through neo-classical models. In these models, firms will 
invest up to equalise the marginal productivity and the marginal cost of capital. The   
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mainstream of the economic literature focuses on marginal investments. A marginal 
investment yields a rate of return after tax that is just sufficient to persuade investors to 
make the initial outlay. This rate of return (also called the cost of capital
1) and the 
effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) that is a derived indicator enable to measure the 
impact of taxation and public incentives on investment decision. King and Fullerton 
(1984) define the EMTR as the ratio of the tax wedge on the capital cost
2. The tax 
wedge is the difference between the pre-tax rate of return earned by the firm on the 
marginal investment and the post-tax rate of return earned by the supplier of funds.  
 
The capital cost and the marginal effective tax rate prove to be appropriate indicators to 
determine the optimal level of investment. This question requires indeed an approach in 
terms of marginal calculation. Conversely, a location decision has to discriminate 
between some discrete choices that are mutually exclusive. In the presence of 
economies of scale or imperfect competition, the various options may yield different 
levels of economic rent i.e. some rates of return that are above the minimum required 
after-tax rate of return. As some recent contributions pointed out, especially Devereux 
& Griffith (1998, 1999 and 2003), such a matter calls for an approach in terms of 
effective average tax rate (EATR)
3. 
 
The EATR sets out to apprehend the total tax burden that is actually paid by the firm 
and its shareholders. It is defined by expression (1) that is the ratio of two terms. The 
numerator measures the difference between the net present value of the economic rent 
before tax, R
*, earned by the investment and its equivalent after tax, R. The 







TR EA =          ( 1 )  
 
The model developed by Devereux & Griffith (2003) is based on the calculation of the 
value of the firm. It considers a one-period perturbation of the capital stock. Investment 
is up one unit in period t and reduced in period t+1 so that the capital stock is left 
                                                 
1 For pioneering developments, see Jorgenson (1963) or Hall and Jorgenson (1967). 
2 See also Alworth (1988), OECD (1991) or Ruding (1992) for international settings. 
3 See also EEC (2001).   
  6
unchanged in any other periods. This investment generates a real financial return, p, in 
period t+1.  
 
Therefore, if we denote the real market interest rate as r, the net present value of the pre-
tax economic rent R
* is equal to: 
 





=           ( 2 )  
 









=           ( 3 )  
 
The net present value of the post-tax economic rent, R, is the key parameter in 
Devereux and Griffith (1999)’s approach. It captures in a summary statistics the major 
features of the tax system, including the investment subsidy, which might affect the 
decision of the firm, as well as the economic parameters, such as the economic 
depreciation rate, the real financial return of the investment or the inflation rate. 
Moreover, it is defined in different terms depending on the financing choice. Devereux 
and Griffith (2003) show that the value of the post-tax economic rent can be broken up 
into two terms, depending on whether the investment is financed by retained earnings or 
by raising external funds (loan or issue of new shares). The external finance generates 
additional cash flows which come in addition to the rent associated with a financing by 
undistributed profits. Accordingly, the post-tax economic rent R can be expressed as : 
 
R = R
RE  +   F           ( 4 )  
 
where R
RE is the after-tax rent for a financing by retained earnings and F stands for the 
additional cash flows arising from the use of external finance. The change in the firm’s 
market value that is induced by the one-period variation of the capital stock provides 
Devereux and Griffith (1999) with the following expression of the post-tax economic 








[(1+π)(p+δ)(1-τ)+(1+π)(1-δ)(1-A)]    (5) 
 
In expression (5), γ is the tax discrimination between new equity and distributions. In 
analytical terms, γ is equal to (1-m
d)/(1-c)(1-z) where m
d is the personal tax rate on 
dividend income, c is the rate of tax credit on dividend paid and z denotes the capital 
gain tax. The variable ρ denotes the shareholder’s nominal discount rate with ρ = (1-
m
i)i/(1-z) where m
i is the personal tax rate on interest income. δ is the one-period cost 
of depreciation of the asset; π measures the expected inflation rate, τ is the corporate tax 
rate and A expresses the discounted value of any public allowances.  
 
Effective tax models traditionally distinguish three main categories of public incentives: 
standard depreciation allowances, immediate expensing or free tax depreciation and 
capital grants. The present value of public allowances per unit of investment can be 
therefore expressed as A = τAd + ϕτ + g. The term Adτ is the present value of tax 
savings from depreciation allowances; ϕ expresses the proportion of investment 
expenditure which is entitled to immediate expensing and g is the rate of capital grant. 
 
What is the meaning of R
RE? The firm finances the investment by reducing dividends in 
the first period (period t). This operation is thereafter offset in period t+1 by a 
corresponding increase of distributed dividends. In time t, the cost of the investment in 
net present value amounts to (1-A). In period t+1, the additional dividend is accordingly 
equal to (1-A)(1+π)(1-δ). The after-corporate-tax nominal return of the investment in 
period t+1 is equal to (p+δ)(1+π)(1-τ). The revenue generated in period t+1 is then 
taxed at the rate γ, which reflects the various aspects of the personal taxation. Finally, it 
is discounted at ρ, the shareholder’s nominal discount rate. 
 
The financing of the investment by an issue of new equity or by debt generates 
additional cash flows, F, that affect the post-tax net present value of the economic rent. 
In the case of new equity finance, the shareholder’s contribution rises by (1-ϕτ-g), i.e. 
the cost of the investment reduced by the immediate tax rebate and the investment 
subsidy. In period t+1, the firm repurchases the new shares, generating an increased net   
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income equal to γ(1-ϕτ-g). The expression of additional cash flows when the investment 




) ρ + (1
) γ - 1 ( ρ
(1-ϕτ-g)          (6) 
 
When the investment is financed by debt, the firm borrows the amount (1-ϕτ-g) in 
period t, giving the shareholder an additional income equal to γ(1-ϕτ-g). In the second 
period, the firm repays the debt with interest, that is (1-ϕτ-g)(1+i). However, the interest 
payments are tax deductible, what reduces the financial cost by (1-ϕτ-g)iτ. Combining 




) ρ + (1
g) - φτ - 1 ( γ
[ρ-i(1-τ) ]         ( 7 )  
 
Finally, it is a major advantage of the Devereux and Griffith (2003)’s framework to 
permit to calculate easily the cost of capital, that is the pre-tax financial rate of return 
that is required to generate a post-tax economic rent equal to zero. We therefore obtain 
the following expression for the capital cost, denotedp ~ : 
 
[] δ −
π + τ − γ
ρ +
− π − π + δ + ρ
π + τ −
−
=
) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 ( F
) 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
) A 1 (
p ~     (8) 
 
where F corresponds to F
NE or F
D, depending on the source of finance, respectively new 
equity or debt. When the firm uses retained earnings, F is equal to zero. 
 
Expression (8) of the capital cost is quite similar to the traditional King and Fullerton 
(1984)’s formulation, except that the net present value (NPV) of depreciation 
allowances A is calculated using the shareholder’s discount rate ρ (instead of the 
financial cost) and that the immediate tax expensing (τϕ) plays a role, rather than 
simply the net present value of allowances. 
   
  9
In section 3, we will use Devereux and Griffith (2003)’s analytical framework to derive 
the cost for the public authorities to grant investment incentives. 
 
 
3.  Assessing the impact of public policy 
 
By and large, public authorities use both fiscal and financial incentives to directly 
stimulate capital formation. In this paper we pay attention to two of these incentives that 
are commonly used in regional policy, i.e. lowering the corporate tax rate and granting a 
capital subsidy. These two instruments necessarily affect the public treasury. In order to 
evaluate their relative efficiency, we develop a methodology aimed at measuring the 
amount of public expenses associated with a lowering of the corporate tax rate and the 
granting of a capital subsidy. 
 
3.1 The public costs 
 
In Devereux and Griffith (2003)’s analytical framework public policies affect the 
post-tax economic rent R earned by the shareholder, whereas the pre-tax economic rent 
R
* principally depends on the real financial return of the investment project, which is 
exogenous in the model. Accordingly any change of the corporate tax rate or of the 
capital grant modifies the tax wedge between the pre- and post-tax economic rent. This 
change in the tax wedge corresponds to the variation of the tax revenue for the 
government and therefore represents the public cost generating by the policies. 
However, since the pre-tax economic rent remains constant whatever the policy, the 
costs for the public authorities to grant a tax cut or a capital grant can be derived from 
the sensitivity of the NPV of the post-tax economic rent respectively to the corporate 
tax rate and the rate of capital subsidy. Let us consider first the costs associated with a 
variation of the tax rate before deriving the costs for the government to grant a capital 
subsidy. 
   
Table 1 presents the analytical expressions of the public cost generated by a lowering of 
the corporate tax rate (τ). The cost varies according to the investment financing used by   
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the firm: retained earnings, new equity or debt. Since we consider the viewpoint of 
public authorities, the discount rate used is the public opportunity cost, .
* ρ  
 
TABLE 1: Public cost of lowering the corporate tax rate (Cτ) 
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For the public authorities, the costs incurred in modifying the corporate tax rate by dτ is 
determined by the sensitivity of the post-tax economic rent in present value to the 
corporate tax rate, ∂R/∂τ. The extent of the tax cut, dτ, will be discussed further.
4  
 
For all sources of investment finance, the direct effect of lowering the corporate tax 
rate
5 is to increase the before-personal tax revenue of the investment. However, this 
effect is indirectly lessened by a reduction of the tax savings due to immediate 
expensing as well as to depreciation allowances. The 
term [ ] { } τ π δ π π δ ρ φ d 1 p 1 Ad ) )( ( ) ( ) (
* + + − − + + +  in the expressions above reflects both 
direct and indirect effects. 
 
When the firm uses external finance, i.e. new equity or debt, additional cash flows 
(respectively F
NE and F
D) modify the economic rent and, therefore, the public costs. For 
both new equity and debt, a lower corporate tax rate reduces the value of the immediate 
tax allowance ) (φτ that can be claimed on the additional cash flows. In case of debt 
financed investment, this effect is still reinforced by the declining of tax savings due to 
the deductibility of interests from the tax base (1-τ)i. 
 
Table 2 now shows the analytical expressions of the public cost associated with the 
granting of a capital subsidy. The capital subsidy is defined net of corporate tax. 
                                                 
4 See Table 3. 
5 That is dτ < 0.   
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TABLE 2: Public cost of granting a capital subsidy (Cg) 
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In Table 2, dg stands for the extent of the capital grant. Compared with the former 
policy, the public cost is here independent of the real financial return, p. The rate of 
capital subsidy only applies to the value of the investment effectively used by the firm, 
which is the difference between the investment value in periods t and t+1. This is 
expressed by 
1-[(1-δ)(1+π)/(1+ρ
*)]. However, since the capital subsidy is granted in the first period, it 
can be used to finance a proportion of the investment, therefore reducing the amount of 
external finance the firm has to raise. 
 
In addition to the sensitivity of the NPV of the post-tax economic rent, the public cost 
associated to a tax cut or the granting of a capital subsidy is determined by the extent of 
these incentives, respectively noted dτ and dg. This extent obviously depends on the 
objective adopted by the government, as well as on the ability of the policy instruments 
to achieve this objective. This will be discussed now. 
 
3.2 The extent of public incentives 
 
Traditionally, the effectiveness of investment incentives has been apprehended 
through their impact on the effective marginal tax rate. Some recent works show 
however that if the EMTR proves to be an appropriate indicator of the level of 
investment, discrete investment decisions principally depend on the average effective 
tax rate. So, as pointed out by Giannini and Maggiulli (2002), both average and 
marginal approaches are important but they serve different purposes: the former 
captures the effects of taxation on the location decisions (and other discrete choices) 
while the latter influences the size of investment, once the location decision has been   
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made. In terms of regional policy, whether it seeks to attract non-local firms’ investment 
projects or rather to expand investment demand of firms already settled in the region, 
the government will pay attention to the effective average or marginal tax rates, 
respectively. Both objectives are considered in this contribution. Accordingly the extent 
of public interventions, expressed by dτ and dg respectively for lowering the corporate 
tax rate and granting a capital subsidy, can be analytically apprehended first by the 
differential of the EMTR (dEMTR) and then by the differential of the EATR (dEATR). 
For the sake of simplicity, each investment incentive will be examined separately. The 
expressions of the differentials and the extent to which each policy has to be 
implemented are shown in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3: Calculating the extent of public incentives (dτ and dg) 


























































































A numerical example will help us go further in the analysis. 
 
 
4.  Applications 
 
In order to illustrate the relevance of our approach and to solve the indetermination 
of the analytical expressions derived in Section 2, we shall consider the following 
scenario, which captures the main tax devices in force in Belgium. The corporate tax 
rate (τ) amounts to 33.99% for distributed profits as well as for retained earnings and 
there is no double tax relief for dividends (the classical system is implemented). The 
personal tax rates are equal to 15% both for interest (m
i) and dividend income (m
d).   
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Capital gains are not taxed at the individual level. The pattern allowed for tax 
depreciation is the straight-line method. We suppose that the life-time of capital is 10 
years. We also consider that an immediate tax allowance can be claimed at the rate of 
10% (ϕ). Finally, the following parameters are used to characterise the economic 
environment: the real interest rate (r) and the inflation rate (π) are respectively equal to 
6% and 1.5%. The capital depreciation rate (δ) is supposed to be exponential and equal 
to 20% and the public opportunity cost (ρ
*) is set at 4%. 
 
As already mentioned the cost for the public authorities to grant a tax cut or a capital 
subsidy depends on two elements. The first one is the sensitivity of the post-tax 
economic rent to the corporate tax rate and to the rate of the capital subsidy, which are 
the unit costs of both policies. The second element measures the variation of both public 
instruments. This variation depends on the variable chosen by the government to 
stimulate investment, either the EMTR or the EATR. The results will therefore be 
presented successively according to these channels. 
 
 
4.1 Lowering the effective marginal tax rate 
 
Table 4 shows the public costs associated with a tax cut and a capital subsidy, when 
the government aims at lowering the effective marginal tax rate by one point of 
percentage. We distinguish but the three sources of finance, various real financial 
returns of the investment. 
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TABLE 4: Public cost (in cents) associated with a corporate tax cut and a capital subsidy, when 
the government aims at lowering the EMTR by one point of percentage. 
Investment profitability (p)   
Cost of capital  20%  40% 
Retained Earnings  0.075  0.184  0.355 
New Equity  0.109  0.226  0.437 
Corporate tax  cut 
(Cτ) 
Debt 0.008  -0.174  -0.417 
        
Retained Earnings  0.052  0.052  0.052 
New Equity  0.078  0.078  0.078 
Capital 
subsidy grant 
(Cg)  Debt 0.029  0.029  0.029 
 
What are the main results? As shown in Table 4, the public cost associated with the 
granting of a capital subsidy (Cg) is invariant whatever the profitability of the 
investment is. It only depends on the value of the investment and thus is not affected by 
the rate of return of the investment. For debt financing, the public cost is equal to 0.029 
cent per euro invested. It rises to nearly 0.08 cent for an issue of new shares. An 
investment financed by retained earnings induces a cost of 0.052 cent per euro of 
private capital. 
 
On the contrary, the public cost associated with a corporate tax cut (Cτ) varies with the 
profitability of the investment. This result was expected because the corporate tax rate 
applies to the total capital income. It is useful to distinguish according to the source of 
investment financing. For retained earnings and new equity, the higher is the real 
financial return of the investment, the more expensive is the public policy generated by 
a lowering of the corporate tax rate. When the investment is financed by debt, the 
results in Table 4 show an opposite pattern. The cost borne by the public authorities 
becomes lower as the financial return of the investment increases. Positive for the 
marginal investment, the public cost becomes even negative as the financial return rises 
to 20% and 40%, which means that the policy generates an additional fiscal revenue for 
the government. 
 
How to explain these latter outcomes? Broadly speaking, whatever the source of 
finance, lowering the corporate tax rate has a direct impact on the firm’s tax liability. 
However, this effect is lessened by the reducing of the tax savings due to immediate   
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expensing and depreciation allowances. In addition, when the investment is financed by 
new equity or by debt, other indirect effects occur. By reducing the value of the tax 
rebate which can be immediately claimed on external finance, the tax cut increases the 
amount of new equity and debt the firm has to raise. Finally, this negative effect is still 
reinforced in case of debt financing: it reduces the tax savings due to the deductibility of 
interests from the tax base. In this respect, it is a priori difficult to determine which 
effect will prevail.  
 
In our scenario, as shown in Table 5, the government willing to reduce by one point of 
percentage the effective marginal tax rate of an investment financed by retained 
earnings or new equity has to lower the corporate tax rate by 1.03 or 1.27 point of 
percentage, respectively. However, in case of debt financing, we observe paradoxical 
results. The addition of the various indirect effects of a tax change (on immediate 
expensing, depreciation allowances and deductibility of interests from the tax base) 
invites the government to rise the corporate tax rate by 1.47 point of percentage. Table 5 
shows the extent of the capital grant (dg) and of the corporate tax rate change (dτ) 
required to reduce the EMTR by one point of percentage. 
 
TABLE 5: Corporate tax rate change and capital subsidy required for a lowering of one point of 
percentage of the EMTR 
  Corporate tax rate change (dτ)  Capital subsidy (dg) 
Retained Earnings  - 1.03  + 0.28 
New Equity  - 1.27  + 0.41 
Debt  + 1.47  + 0.15 
The values for dg and dτ are expressed in points of percentage. 
 
The same conflicting effects affect the unit cost of changing the corporate tax rate. 
However, the unit public cost also depends on the financial return of the investment.  
 
Combining the direct and indirect effects of the corporate tax cut on the extent of the 
policy and on its unit cost, as well as the level of the investment profitability, allows 
explaining the results shown in Table 4. Especially, for an investment financed by debt 
and generating a pre-tax financial return equal to 20% or 40%, the increase of the 
corporate tax rate provides the public authorities with an additional fiscal revenue,   
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respectively equals to 0.174 and 0.417 cent per euro invested. However, when the 
investment profitability is close to the cost of capital, the public cost associated with the 
rise of the corporate tax rate amounts to 0.008 cent per euro invested. In this latter case, 
the tax base is not large enough so that the additional tax revenue can compensate the 
increase of the tax allowances value resulting from a higher corporate tax rate. 
 
What is the most efficient investment incentive when the government aims at lowering 
the effective marginal tax rate? When the investment is financed by retained earnings or 
by new equity, granting a capital subsidy is the least costly policy. The public cost 
associated with a tax cut is superior to that of a capital grant and increases with the 
profitability of the investment. In case of debt financing, the results are quite different: 
whatever the rate of profit of the investment, raising the corporate tax rate is more 
efficient than granting a financial subsidy. For the projects, whose profitability is just 
sufficient and accordingly returns are close to the capital cost, raising the corporate tax 
rate implies a positive public cost, but this cost rapidly becomes negative as the real 
financial return of the investment increases. Therefore, in no case, our results show that 




4.2 Lowering the effective average tax rate 
 
Alternatively, public authorities can choose to reduce the effective average tax rate 
in order to attract non-regional firms’ activities. As shown by Devereux and Griffith 
(2003), discrete investment choices do depend on the level of the average effective 
taxation, while the effective marginal tax rate is expected only to affect the size of the 
project. Table 5 shows respectively the public cost associated with a corporate tax cut 
and with a capital subsidy. Both incentives are granted in order to lower the effective 
average tax rate by one point of percentage. We still consider three sources of finance 
(retained earnings, new equity and debt) and various real financial returns of the 
investment. 
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TABLE 6: Public cost (in cents) associated with a corporate tax rate cut and a capital subsidy, 
for a lowering of one point of percentage of the effective average tax rate 
Investment profitability (p)   
Cost of capital  20%  40% 
Retained Earnings  0.090  0.213  0.406 
New Equity  0.106  0.213  0.406 
Corporate tax  cut 
(Cτ) 
Debt 0.013  0.220  0.407 
        
Retained Earnings  0.063  0.174  0.349 
New Equity  0.076  0.172  0.344 
Capital 
subsidy grant 
(Cg)  Debt 0.049  0.193  0.386 
 
As shown in Table 6, whatever the source of finance, public costs associated with a 
corporate tax cut and with a capital subsidy rise as the profitability of the investment 
increases. These results significantly differ from the public costs presented in Table 4.  
 
How to explain these differences? As mentioned the public costs are composed of two 
elements: the unit cost and the extent of the measures. The former, which corresponds 
to the sensibility of the post-tax economic rent, is invariant whether the policymakers 
seek to lower the EMTR or rather the EATR. Conversely the extent of public 
intervention does depend on the variable chosen by the government to stimulate 
investment. Table 7 shows the extent of public incentive (dτ and dg) required to reduce 
the EATR by one point of percentage. 
 
TABLE 7: Public policies that are required to lower the effective average tax rate of one point 
of percentage 
Investment profitability (p)   
Cost of capital  20%  40% 
Retained Earnings  -1.235  -1.189  -1.176 
New Equity  -1.238  -1.195  -1.180 
Corporate tax  
cut (dτ) 
Debt 2.478  -1.862  -1.432 
        
Retained Earnings  0.336  0.936  1.872 
New Equity  0.395  0.895  1.791 
Capital subsidy 
grant (dg) 
Debt 0.253  0.992  1.985 
The values for dτ and dg are expressed in points of percentage. 
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From Table 7 and contrary to the previous case, i.e. when the government aims at 
lowering the effective marginal tax rate, we notice that the change in each instrument 
that is required to lower the EATR of one point of percentage varies with the investment 
profitability. On the one hand, the extent of the capital subsidy increases when the rate 
of the real financial return of the investment increases. In other words, the sensitivity of 
the EATR to the rate of capital subsidy lowers when the investment profitability 
increases. Conversely, the extent of the tax cut always decreases as the predicted return 
of the project becomes higher.  
 
These results derive from an interesting property of the EATR highlighted by Devereux 
and Griffith (2003). As the rate of the investment profitability increases, the EATR 
becomes more and more determined by the rate of corporate taxation. This is intuitive: 
“for very profitable investment projects, allowances become insignificant: the only 
relevant factor is the rate at which income is taxed”.
6 Therefore, lowering the EATR 
requires a more and more higher capital subsidy as the rate of profit increases. 
Conversely, the more profitable is the investment, the lesser should be the extent of the 
corporate tax cut. However, for poorly profitable investments financed by debt, the 
government should actually raise the corporate tax rate in order to obtain a reducing of 
the EATR by one point of percentage.  
 
This property of the EATR directly accounts for the results in Table 6 relative to the 
public costs of the policy instruments. A capital subsidy is more costly as the financial 
return of the investment increases. On the other hand, we observe that the public cost of 
lowering the corporate tax rate also increases with the level of profit. Although the 
required extent of the tax cut may be less important, the fiscal losses are of growing 
importance as the rate of profit of the investment grows.  
 
As before, granting a capital subsidy appears to be a better policy choice than lowering 
the corporate tax rate. However, for marginal and lightly profitable investments 
financed by debt, the public authorities should raise the corporate tax rate. This effect, 
previously explained, comes from the greater extent of the tax change on the various 
allowances than on the tax liability. 
                                                 
6 Devereux and Griffith (2003), p. 11.   
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5.  Conclusion 
 
For decades, most industrialised countries have implemented some forms of fiscal 
and financial instruments to promote local capital formation. This paper has 
investigated the efficiency of two instruments commonly used in regional policy: a tax 
cut and a capital subsidy. These incentives are expected to produce a double effect on 
the economic development of regions: on the one hand, they can expand local firms’ 
investment demand and on the other hand, they can help attract non-regional firms’ 
activities. In determining its policy, the government can be sensitive to one or the other 
of these arguments. Accordingly, the effectiveness of a tax cut or of a capital grant 
cannot be assessed disregarding the option chosen by the government. 
 
Effective marginal and average tax rates prove to be appropriate indicators to evaluate 
the impact of taxation and public incentives on firms’ investment decisions. The size of 
the investment directly depends on the effective marginal tax rate, whereas the average 
approach is adequate to determine the location choice (or any other discrete investment 
decisions generating after-tax positive economic rent). 
 
The model of effective average taxation, recently developed by Devereux and Griffith 
(2003), provides an adequate framework to analyse the efficiency of public incentives. 
It allows the calculation of both effective marginal and average tax rates.  
 
Calculating the sensitivity of the expected after-tax economic rent of the investment to 
the public incentives, we have derived the analytical expressions of the public cost 
associated with a lowering of the corporate tax rate or the granting of a capital subsidy. 
This public cost necessarily depends on the effective tax rate – either marginal or 
average – that the government aims at lowering to influence firms’ investment 
decisions. 
 
The results suggest that, whatever the public authorities’ objective, lowering the 
corporate tax rate do not appear to be an efficient policy tool in comparison with the 
granting of a financial aid, which is generally the least costly intervention. However, 
depending on the level of the project profitability, it should be better for the government   
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to increase the corporate tax rate in case of debt financing. These outcomes are 
explained by the complex interplay of various direct and indirect effects of a tax cut and 
the granting of a capital subsidy on the post-tax economic rent of the investment.   
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